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Summary and Keywords
For nearly a decade, American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain 
an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. After U.S. troops departed in 
1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted a lasting search to explain the 
United States’ first lost war. Historians of the conflict and participants alike have since 
critiqued the ways in which civilian policymakers and uniformed leaders applied—some 
argued misapplied—military power that led to such an undesirable political outcome. 
While some claimed U.S. politicians failed to commit their nation’s full military might to a 
limited war, others contended that most officers fundamentally misunderstood the nature 
of the war they were fighting. Still others argued “winning” was essentially impossible 
given the true nature of a struggle over Vietnamese national identity in the postcolonial 
era. On their own, none of these arguments fully satisfy. Contemporary policymakers 
clearly understood the difficulties of waging a war in Southeast Asia against an enemy 
committed to national liberation. Yet the faith of these Americans in their power to 
resolve deep-seated local and regional sociopolitical problems eclipsed the possibility 
there might be limits to that power. By asking military strategists to simultaneously fight 
a war and build a nation, senior U.S. policymakers had asked too much of those crafting 
military strategy to deliver on overly ambitious political objectives. In the end, the 
Vietnam War exposed the limits of what American military power could achieve in the 
Cold War era.
Keywords: Abrams, Creighton, attrition, Cold War, counterinsurgency, Johnson, Lyndon, limited war, Nixon,
Richard, strategy, Vietnam War, Westmoreland, William
Introduction
American Military Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965–
1973 
Gregory A. Daddis
Subject:  20th Century: Post-1945, Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy
Online Publication Date:  Mar 2015 DOI:  10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.239
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American 
History
American Military Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965–1973
Page 2 of 34
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, AMERICAN HISTORY (americanhistory.oxfordre.com). (c) 
Oxford University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details 
see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
By mid-June 1951, the Korean War had settled into an uneasy, yet conspicuous stalemate. 
Having blunted North Korean and Chinese offensives that killed thousands of soldiers and 
civilians, the United Nations forces, now under command of General Matthew B. Ridgway, 
dug in as both sides agreed to open negotiations. Though the enemy had suffered heavily 
under the weight of allied ground and air power, Washington and its partners had little 
stomach to press northward. As the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff declared, the objective was 
to effect “an end to the fighting . . . and a return to the status quo.”  Thus, President 
Harry Truman’s decision in April to relieve General Douglas MacArthur—who in 
Ridgway’s words “envisaged no less than the global defeat of communism”—suggested 
that political limitations were now an intrinsic part of developing and implementing 
strategy in a time of war. Yet what was the purpose of war and strategy if not the 
complete destruction of enemy forces? In a time when men had “control of machines 
capable of laying a world to waste,” Ridgway believed escalation without restraint would 
lead to disaster. Civilian and military authorities had to set attainable goals and work 
closely in selecting the means to achieve them.
Ridgway’s admonitions forecast inherent problems in a Cold War period increasingly 
dubbed an era of “limited war.” In short, the very definition of wartime victory seemed in 
flux. An uncertain end to the fighting in Korea implied there were, in fact, substitutes to 
winning outright on the field of battle. Even if Korea demonstrated the successful 
application of communist containment, at least one student of strategy lamented that 
limited war connoted “a deliberate hobbling of tremendous power.”  A Manichean view of 
the Cold War, however, presented knotty problems for those seeking to confront 
seemingly expansion-minded communists without unintentionally escalating beyond some 
nuclear threshold. How could one fight a national war for survival against communism yet 
agree to negotiate an end to a stalemated war? Political scientist Robert Osgood, writing 
in 1957, judged there were few alternatives to contesting communists who themselves 
were limiting military force to “minimize the risk of precipitating total war.” For Osgood, 
the challenge was to think about contemporary war as more than simply a physical 
contest between opposing armies. “The problem of limited war is not just a problem of 
military strategy but is, more broadly, the problem of combining military power with 
diplomacy and with the economic and psychological instruments of power within a 
coherent national strategy that is capable of supporting the United States’ political 
objectives abroad.”
If Osgood was correct in suggesting that war required more than just an application of 
military power, then strategy—as a problem to be solved—entailed more than just 
battlefield expertise. Thus, the post–World War II generation of U.S. Army officers was 
forced to think about war more broadly. And they did. Far from being slaves to 
conventional operations, officers ascending the ranks in the 1950s to command in 
Vietnam understood the rising importance of local insurgency movements. As Andrew 
Birtle has persuasively argued, by 1965 the army had “succeeded in integrating 
counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla warfare in substantive ways into its doctrinal, 
educational, and training systems.”  An examination of contemporary professional 
journals such as Military Review reveals a military establishment wrestling with the 
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problems of local economic and social development, the importance of community 
politics, and the role played by indigenous security forces. In truth, officers of the day, 
echoing the recommendations of Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, did not define 
limited wars in purely military terms. Rather, they perceived strategic problems as those 
involving changes in technologies, societies, and, perhaps most importantly, political 
ideas.
These same officers labored to devise a coherent strategy for a limited contest in 
Southeast Asia within the larger construct of the Cold War. In an important sense, the 
development of strategy for all combatants necessitated attention to multiple layers, all 
interlaced. As Lyndon Johnson recalled of Vietnam in his 1971 memoir, “It was a political 
war, an economic war, and a fighting war—all at the same time.”  Moreover, American 
political and military leaders found that Cold War calculations mattered just as much as 
the fighting inside South Vietnam. Fears of appearing weak against communism 
compelled the Johnson White House to escalate in 1965 when it looked like Hanoi was 
making its final bid for Indochinese domination. As Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara told a journalist in April, if the United States withdrew from Vietnam “there 
would be a complete shift of world power. Asia goes Red, our prestige and integrity 
damaged, allies everywhere shaken.” Thus, paraphrasing military theorist Basil Liddell 
Hart, policy imperatives at the level of grand strategy would set the foundations for—and 
later circumscribe—the application of military strategy on a lower plane.
Liddell Hart’s council that strategy involved more than “fighting power” would lead 
American officers in Vietnam into a near insolvable dilemma. Clearly, the civil war inside 
Vietnam was more than just a military problem. Yet in the quest to broaden their 
conception of war, to consider political and social issues as much as military ones, senior 
leaders developed a strategy that was so wide-ranging as to be unmanageable. Rather 
than a narrow focus on enemy attrition, sheer comprehensiveness proved to be a crucial 
factor undermining American strategy in Vietnam. In attempting to both destroy an 
adversary and build a nation, uniformed leaders overestimated their capacity to manage a 
conflict that had long preceded American involvement. A near unquestioning faith in the 
capacity to do everything overshadowed any unease with entanglement in a civil war 
rooted in competing notions of national liberation and identity.  In the end, senior U.S. 
policymakers had asked too much of those crafting military strategy to deliver on overly 
ambitious political objectives.
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Devising Strategy for a New Kind of War
By June 1965, General William C. Westmoreland had been serving in the Republic of 
Vietnam for eighteen months. As the newly appointed commander of the U.S. Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the former West Point superintendent was heir to 
a legacy of varied strategic initiatives aimed at sustaining an independent, noncommunist 
foothold in Southeast Asia. Since the division of Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel in 
1954, an American military assistance and advisory group (MAAG) had been training 
local forces for a threat both externally military and internally political.  The image of 
North Korean forces streaming across an international boundary in 1950 surely weighed 
heavily on U.S. officers. Yet these same men understood the importance of a steady 
economy and secure social structure in combating the growing insurgent threat inside 
South Vietnam. Consequently, the U.S. advisory group focused on more than just advising 
the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) for conventional operations against 
the North Vietnam Army (NVA).
As advisers, however, the Americans could not dictate strategy to their Vietnamese allies. 
President Ngo Dinh Diem, struggling to gain popular support for his own social 
revolution, equally sought ways to secure the population—through programs like
agrovilles and strategic hamlets—from a rising communist insurgency. Yet achieving 
consensus with (and between) Americans proved difficult. Staff officers debated how best 
to balance economic and political development with population security and the training 
of South Vietnamese forces.  Was the threat more military or political, more external or 
internal? Were local paramilitary forces or the conventional army better suited to dealing 
with these threats? All the while, a shadow government competed for influence within the 
countryside. When MACV was established in February 1962, its chief, Paul D. Harkins, 
received the mission to “assist and support the Government of South Vietnam in its 
efforts to provide for its internal security, defeat Communist insurgency, and resist overt 
aggression.”  Here was a tall order. Moreover, as military operations required a solid 
political footing for ultimate success, an unstable Saigon government further complicated 
American strategic planning. Following Diem’s overthrow and death in November 1963, 
the foundations on which the U.S. presence in South Vietnam rested appeared shaky at 
best. Hanoi’s own escalation in 1964 did little to assuage concern.
Though cognizant of the difficulties ahead, American leaders felt they had little choice 
but to persevere in South Vietnam. By early 1965, with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
authorizing him to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” to assist 
South Vietnam, President Johnson believed he had little alternative but to escalate. He 
was in a difficult position. Hoping to preserve his domestic agenda but stand strong 
against communist aggression, Johnson initially hesitated on committing ground troops. 
Instead, he turned to airpower. Operation Rolling Thunder, launched in early March 1965, 
aimed at eliminating Hanoi’s support of the southern insurgency. Concurrently, Johnson 
hoped, in Michael Hunt’s words, to “bring a better life to the people of Vietnam—on 
10
11
12
13
14
American Military Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965–1973
Page 5 of 34
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, AMERICAN HISTORY (americanhistory.oxfordre.com). (c) 
Oxford University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details 
see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
American terms.”  The president would be disappointed on both counts. The punitive 
bombing of North Vietnam did little to interfere with Hanoi’s support of the insurgents 
and nothing to resolve the internal political problems of South Vietnam. Moreover, 
military leaders complained that the president’s gradual response, of limiting the tempo 
and ferocity of the air campaign, unduly limited American military might. (Few worried as 
restlessly as Johnson about full-blown Chinese or Soviet intervention.) By the spring, it 
became clear the president’s policies in South Vietnam were failing. In June, 
Westmoreland officially requested additional troops “as a stop-gap measure to save the 
ARVN from defeat.”
The decision to escalate in Vietnam persists as one of the most controversial in twentieth-
century American foreign policy. Competing interpretations revolve around the question 
of purpose. Was escalation chosen as a matter of policy, of containing communism 
abroad? Was it used as a way to test American capacity in nation-building, of expanding 
democracy overseas? Or did escalation flow from concerns about prestige and credibility, 
both national and political? Clearly Johnson considered all these matters in the critical 
months of early 1965, and it is plausible to argue that the president believed he had few 
alternatives given reports of South Vietnam being on the verge of collapse. Yet ultimately 
intervention was a matter of choice.  Johnson feared the political ramifications and 
personal consequences of “losing” Vietnam just as Truman had “lost” China. Thus, when 
Westmoreland sent a cable to the Pentagon in early June requesting 40,000 combat 
troops immediately and more than 50,000 later, hasty deliberations in the White House 
led to support for MACV’s appeal. As McNamara later recalled, “South Vietnam seemed 
to be crumbling, with the only apparent antidote a massive injection of US troops.”
The task now fell to Westmoreland to devise an offensive strategy to use these troops. 
Realizing Hanoi had committed regular army regiments and battalions to South Vietnam, 
the MACV commander believed he had no choice but to contest this conventional threat. 
But he also had to provide security “from the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the 
informer.”  MACV’s chief intelligence officer drew attention to these diverse 
undertakings. As Phillip B. Davidson recalled, Westmoreland “had not one battle, but 
three to fight: first, to contain a growing enemy conventional threat; second, to develop 
the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces (RVNAF); and third, to pacify and protect the 
peasants in the South Vietnamese countryside. Each was a monumental task.”  Far from 
being wedded to a battle-centric strategy aimed at racking up high body counts, 
Westmoreland developed a comprehensive campaign plan for employing his forces that 
factored in more than just killing the enemy.
Stabilization and security of South Vietnam formed the bedrock of Westmoreland’s 
“three-phase sustained campaign.” Phase I visualized the commitment of U.S. and allied 
forces “necessary to halt the losing trend by 1965.” Tasks included securing allied 
military bases, defending major political and population centers, and strengthening the 
RVNAF. In Phase II, Westmoreland sought to resume the offensive to “destroy enemy 
forces” and reinstitute “rural construction activities.” In this phase, aimed to begin in 
1966, American forces would “participate in clearing, securing, reserve reaction and 
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offensive operations as required to support and sustain the resumption of pacification.” 
Finally, in Phase III, MACV would oversee the “defeat and destruction of the remaining 
enemy forces and base areas.” It is important to note that Westmoreland’s plan included 
the term “sustained campaign.”  The general was under no illusions that U.S. forces 
were engaged in a war of annihilation aimed at the rapid destruction of the enemy. 
Attrition suggested that a stable South Vietnam, capable of resisting the military and 
political pressures of both internal and external aggressors, would not arise in a matter of 
months or even a few years.
Hanoi’s political and military leaders equally debated the strategic concerns of time, 
resources, and capabilities. Johnson’s decision to commit U.S. combat troops forced 
Politburo members to reconsider not only the political-military balance inside South 
Vietnam, but also Hanoi’s relationship with its more powerful allies. To be sure, national 
communists like Vo Nguyen Giap had discussed the role of a “long-term revolutionary 
war” strategy and the importance of political education in military training.  By 1965, 
however, the massive American buildup complicated strategic deliberations. In December, 
Hanoi’s leadership, increasingly under the sway of First Secretary Le Duan, promulgated 
Lao Dong Party Resolution 12, which outlined a basic strategy to defeat the Americans 
“under any circumstances.” The resolution placed greater emphasis on the military 
struggle as domestic priorities in the North receded into the background. As a result, Le 
Duan battled with senior military officials like Giap over the pace of military operations 
and the building of forces for a general offensive against the southern “puppets.” 
Escalation proved challenging for both sides.
The strategic decision making leading to American intervention in Vietnam illustrates the 
difficulties of developing and implementing strategy for a postcolonial conflict in the 
nuclear era. Even from Hanoi’s perspective, strategy was not a straightforward process. 
A sense of contingency, of choices, and of action and reaction permeate the critical years 
leading to 1965. Why Johnson chose war, and the restrictions he imposed on the conduct 
of that war, remain contentious questions. So too do inquiries into the nature of the threat 
that both Americans and their South Vietnamese allies faced. Finally, the relationship 
between political objectives and the strategy devised to accomplish those objectives 
offers valuable instruction to those researching the faith in, and limitations of, American 
power abroad during the Cold War.
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From Escalation to Stalemate
In March 1965, the first contingent of U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang in Quang Nam 
province. Their mission, to defend American airbases supporting the bombing campaign 
against North Vietnam, called for setting up three defensive “enclaves” at Phu Bai, Da 
Nang, and Chu Lai. As the summer progressed and additional army units arrived in 
country, Westmoreland sought authorization to expand beyond his airfield security 
mission. If South Vietnam was to survive, the general needed to have “a substantial and 
hard-hitting offensive capability . . . with troops that could be maneuvered freely.”  With 
the growing recognition that Rolling Thunder was not achieving desired results, the 
Pentagon gave Westmoreland the green light. The MACV commander’s desires stemmed 
largely from his perception of the enemy. To the general, the greatest threat to South 
Vietnam came not from the National Liberation Front (NLF) insurgency but rather from 
main force units, both NLF and NVA. Westmoreland appreciated the long-term threat 
insurgents posed to Saigon, but he worried that since the enemy had committed larger 
combat units to battle, he ignored them at his peril.
The Americans thus undertook offensive operations to provide a shield for the population, 
one behind which ARVN could promote pacification in the countryside. By early October, 
the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had expanded its operations into the Central Highlands, 
hoping to defeat the enemy and reestablish governmental control in the NLF-dominated 
countryside. Hanoi, however, had continued its own buildup and three North Vietnam 
Army regiments had joined local forces in Pleiku province near the Cambodian border. In 
mid-November, the cavalry’s lead battalion, using new techniques of helicopter insertion 
onto the battlefield, collided with the NVA. For two days the battle raged. Only the 
employment of B-52 strategic bombers, called in for close air support, staved off defeat. 
The battle of Ia Drang clearly demonstrated the necessity of conventional operations—
Westmoreland could not risk NVA regiments controlling the critical Highway 19 and thus 
cutting South Vietnam in two. But the clash raised important questions as well. Was Ia 
Drang an American victory? Would such battles truly impact Hanoi’s will? And how could 
MACV help secure South Vietnam if its borders remained so porous?
Despite the attention Ia Drang drew—Westmoreland publicly called it an “unprecedented 
victory”—revolutionary development and nonmilitary programs never strayed far from 
MACV’s sights. Westmoreland continued to stress psychological operations and civic 
action, even in the aftermath of Ia Drang. In December, he wrote the 1st Infantry 
Division’s commander detailing how the buildup of forces should allow for an increased 
emphasis on pacification: “I am inviting this matter to your personal attention since I feel 
that an effective rural construction program is essential to the success of our mission.”
Unfortunately, these early pacification efforts seemed to be making little progress as 
Hanoi continued infiltrating troops into South Vietnam and desertions from the South 
Vietnamese armed forces rose sharply.  Accordingly, Westmoreland requested an 
additional 41,500 troops. Further deployments might be necessary. The request 
25
26
27
28
29
American Military Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965–1973
Page 8 of 34
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, AMERICAN HISTORY (americanhistory.oxfordre.com). (c) 
Oxford University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details 
see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
staggered the secretary of defense, who now realized there would be no rapid conclusion 
to the war. “The U.S. presence rested on a bowl of jelly,” McNamara recalled. His doubts, 
however, were not forceful enough to derail the president’s commitment to a secure, 
stable, and noncommunist South Vietnam.
When American and South Vietnamese leaders met at Honolulu in early February 1966, 
Johnson publicly reaffirmed that commitment. While Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and 
Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu pledged a “social revolution” in Vietnam, Johnson urged 
an expansion of the “other war,” a term increasingly used to describe allied pacification 
efforts.  Concurrently, McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk defined 
Westmoreland’s goals for the coming year. MACV would increase the South Vietnamese 
population living in secure areas by 10 percent, multiply critical roads and railroads by 20 
percent, and increase the destruction of NLF and NVA base areas by 30 percent. To make 
sure the president’s directives were not ignored, Westmoreland was to augment the 
pacified population by 235,000 and ensure the defense of political and population centers 
under government control. The final goal directed MACV to “attrite, by year’s end, VC/
PAVN forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men in the field.”
The Honolulu conference is a critical episode for understanding American military 
strategy in Vietnam. The comprehensive list of strategic objectives presented by Rusk and 
McNamara forced American commanders to consider the war as an effort in both 
construction and destruction. The conference also reinforced the necessity of thinking 
about strategy in broader terms than simply battle. Attrition of enemy forces was only 
part of a much larger whole. In one sense, pacification of the countryside was a process 
of trying to create political space so the government of South Vietnam (GVN) could 
stabilize. (The New York Times reported in April that a “crisis in Saigon” was snagging 
U.S. efforts.) Yet MACV’s own definition of pacification—“the military, political, economic, 
and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and 
involving the participation of the people”—seemed problematic.  Critics wondered how 
foreigners could build a local government responsive to its people. Furthermore, the 
expansive nature of pacification meant U.S. troops would be asked to fight an elusive 
enemy while implementing a whole host of nonmilitary programs. Thus, while 
Westmoreland and senior commanders emphasized the importance of winning both 
control over and support of the Vietnamese people, American soldiers wrestled with 
building a political community in a land long ravaged by war. That they themselves too 
often brought devastation to the countryside hardly furthered the goals of pacification.
In important ways, waging battle—a necessity given Le Duan’s commitment to a general 
offensive in South Vietnam—undermined U.S. nation-building efforts in 1966 and 
underscored the difficulties of coordinating so many strategic actors. This management 
problem long had been a concern of counterinsurgency theorists. British adviser Sir 
Robert Thompson, a veteran of the Malayan campaign, articulated the need to find a 
“proper balance between the military and the civil effort, with complete coordination in 
all fields. Otherwise a situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting 
results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action.”  The reality of South 
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Vietnam bore out Thompson’s claims. Worried about Saigon’s political collapse, American 
war managers too often focused on short-term, military results. The decentralized nature 
of strategic implementation equally made it difficult to weave provincial franchises into a 
larger national effort.
This lack of coordination led to pressures for a “single-manager” to coordinate the 
increasingly vast American enterprise in South Vietnam. (By the end of 1966, more than 
385,000 U.S. military personnel alone were serving in country.) In May, Westmoreland 
incorporated a new directorate into his headquarters—Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support. While ostensibly a South Vietnamese program, CORDS redefined 
the allied pacification mission.  The directorate’s head, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, 
threw himself into the management problem and assigned each senior U.S. military 
adviser a civilian deputy for revolutionary development. MACV now provided oversight 
for all of the allied pacification-related programs: “territorial security forces, the whole 
RD effort, care and resettlement of refugees, the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms,” or amnesty) 
program to bring VC [Vietcong] to the GVN side, the police program, the attempts to 
stimulate rural economic revival, hamlet schools, and so on.”  In short, CORDS assumed 
full responsibility for pacification.
If CORDS could be viewed as a microcosm of Westmoreland’s comprehensive strategy, it 
also underscored the difficulties of implementing so many programs at once. Physically 
controlling the population did not guarantee allied forces were making inroads against 
the insurgency’s political infrastructure. Improved security conditions did not necessarily 
win civilian “hearts and minds.” Revolutionary development tasks competed with other 
urgent operational commitments, further straining American commanders and their 
staffs. More importantly, pacification required a deeper appreciation of Vietnamese 
culture than most Americans possessed.  Senior officers labored to balance the 
competing requirements of attacking enemy units and performing civic action in the 
hamlets and villages. On the ground, many American soldiers made few distinctions 
between friend and foe when operating in the countryside. The army’s personnel rotation 
policy, under which individual soldiers served for twelve months before returning home, 
only exacerbated these problems. With some units experiencing a 90 percent personnel 
turnover within a three-month period, the pacification process was erratic at best.
As 1967 wore on, American journalists increasingly used words like “stalemate” and 
“quagmire” to describe the war in Vietnam. Early-year operations like Cedar Falls and 
Junction City, though inflicting heavy damage on the enemy, failed to break Hanoi’s will. 
At most, pacification was yielding modest results. Political instability in Saigon continued 
to worry U.S. embassy officials. Both the White House and MACV thus found it ever more 
difficult to convince Americans at home that their sacrifices were generating results.
Even Westmoreland struggled to assess how well his war was advancing. Body counts 
told only a fraction of the story. A lack of fighting in a certain district could either mean 
the area was pacified or the enemy was in such control that battle was unnecessary. Two 
years into the war, American soldiers remained unsure of their progress. (MACV and the 
CIA even debated the number of soldiers within the enemy’s ranks.) President Johnson, 
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however, watched the growing domestic dissent with concern and, given the war’s 
ambiguities, called Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker home in support of a public 
relations campaign. In three appearances in 1967 MACV’s commander reported to 
national audiences his views on the ongoing war. Though guarded in his commentary, 
Westmoreland’s tone nonetheless was optimistic given the president’s desires to disprove 
claims of a stalemated war.
Hanoi’s political and military leaders similarly deliberated their own progress in 1967. 
Because of the American imperialists’ “aggressive nature,” the Politburo acknowledged 
the southern insurgency campaign had stalemated in the countryside. Still, to Le Duan in 
particular, an opportunity existed. A strategic offensive might break the impasse by 
instigating a popular uprising in the South, thus weakening the South Vietnamese–
American alliance and forcing the enemy to the negotiating table. A southern uprising 
might well convince the international community that the United States was unjustly 
fighting against an internally led popular revolution. More importantly, a military defeat 
of the Americans, real or perceived, might change the political context of the entire 
conflict.
During the plan’s first phase, to be executed in late 1967, NVA units would conduct 
conventional operations along South Vietnam’s borders to draw American forces away 
from urban areas and to facilitate NLF infiltration into the cities. Le Duan planned the 
second phase for early 1968, a coordinated offensive by insurgent and regular forces to 
attack allied troops and support popular uprisings in the cities and surrounding areas. 
Additional NVA units would reinforce the uprising in the plan’s final phase by assaulting 
American forces and wearing down U.S. military strength in South Vietnam.
Though Le Duan’s desired popular uprising failed to materialize, the general offensive 
launched in late January 1968 shocked most Americans, especially those watching the 
war at home. Commencing during the Tet holiday, communist forces attacked more than 
200 cities, towns, and villages across South Vietnam. Though not completely surprised, 
Westmoreland had not anticipated the ability of Hanoi to coordinate an offensive of such 
size and scope. The allies, however, reacted quickly and the communists suffered mightily 
under the weight of American and South Vietnamese firepower. Yet the damage to the 
U.S. position in Vietnam, some argued irreparable, had been done. Even in the offensive’s 
first hours, senior CIA analyst George Carver predicted that “the degree of success 
already achieved in Saigon and around the country will adversely affect the image of the 
GVN (and its powerful American allies as well) in the eyes of the people.”  Indeed, Tet 
had taken a heavy psychological toll on the population. After years of U.S. assistance, the 
Saigon government appeared incapable of securing the country against a large-scale 
enemy attack. Any claims of progress seemed artificial at best, intentionally deceitful at 
worst.
News reports about Westmoreland’s late-February request for an additional 206,000 men, 
followed soon after by the president’s decision not to run for reelection, only reinforced 
perceptions of stalemate. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara in 
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early March, wondered aloud how MACV was winning the war yet needed more troops. 
Public opinion mirrored growing doubts within Johnson’s inner circle. A 10 March Gallup 
poll found only 33 percent of Americans believed the United States was making progress 
in the war. Thus, Johnson approved only 10,500 additional troops for Westmoreland and 
in late March suspended all air attacks over North Vietnam in hopes of opening talks with 
Hanoi. If the 1968 Tet offensive was not an outright turning point of the war—many 
historians still consider it to be—Hanoi’s assault and Washington’s response brought 
about a shift in American policy and strategic goals. Westmoreland, hoping for a change 
in strategy that would expand operations into the Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries 
and thus shorten the war, instead received word in late spring that he would be leaving 
Vietnam to become the Chief of Staff of the Army. The best the general had been able to 
achieve was a long and bloody stalemate.
Historians have seized upon the Tet offensive and mid-1968 impasse as proof of a 
misguided military strategy crafted by a narrow-minded general who cared only for piling 
up high body counts. Such arguments should be considered with care. Far from being 
focused only on military operations against enemy main force units, Westmoreland 
instead crafted a strategy that took into account the issues of pacification, civic action, 
land reform, and the training of South Vietnamese units. If Tet illustrated anything, it was 
that battlefield successes—both military and nonmilitary—did not translate automatically 
into larger political outcomes. Despite the wealth of manpower and resources Americans 
brought to South Vietnam, they could not solve Saigon’s underlying political, economic, 
and social problems. Moreover, Westmoreland’s military strategy could not answer the 
basic questions over which the war was fought. In a contest over Vietnamese national 
identity in the postcolonial era, the U.S. mission in South Vietnam could only keep Saigon 
from falling to the communists. It could not convince the people a better future lay with 
an ally, rather than an enemy, of the United States.
From Stalemate to Withdrawal
In June 1968, Creighton W. Abrams, a West Point classmate of Westmoreland, assumed 
command of MACV. Only a month before, the enemy launched a series of new attacks in 
South Vietnam. Dubbed “mini-Tet,” the offensive sputtered out quickly but produced 
125,000 new refugees inside a society already heavily dislocated by years of fighting. 
Reporters were quick to highlight the differences between the outgoing and incoming 
commanders. But Abrams, in Andrew Birtle’s words, differed from Westmoreland “more 
in emphasis than in substance.” Stressing a “one war” concept that viewed the enemy as 
a political-military whole, the new commander confronted familiar problems. As one 
officer recalled, “By the time Abrams arrived on the scene, there were few options left for 
changing the character of the war.”  Certainly, Abrams concerned himself more with 
pacification and ARVN training. These programs rose in importance, though, not because 
of some new strategic concept, but rather because the American phase of the war had 
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largely run its course. From this point forward, the war’s outcome would increasingly rest 
on the actions of the Vietnamese, both North and South. While U.S. officials remained 
committed to an independent, noncommunist Vietnam, peace had replaced military 
victory as Americans’ principal national objective.
The inauguration of Richard M. Nixon in January 1969 underscored the diminishing role 
of South Vietnam in American foreign policy. The new president hoped to concentrate on 
his larger aim of improving relations with China and the Soviet Union. Such foreign policy 
designs hinged on reversing the “Americanization” of the war in Southeast Asia while 
fortifying South Vietnam to withstand future communist aggression. As Nixon’s national 
security advisor Henry Kissinger recalled, the challenge was to withdraw American forces 
“as an expression of policy and not as a collapse.”  Of course, Nixon, still the Cold War 
warrior, remained committed to opposing the expansion of communism. Withdrawal from 
Vietnam thus required maintaining an image of strength during peace negotiations if the 
United States was to retain credibility as a world power and a deterrent to communist 
expansion. Nixon’s goal of “peace with honor” thus would hold crucial implications for 
military strategists inside Vietnam.
In truth, Nixon’s larger policy goals complicated the process of de-Americanizing the war, 
soon dubbed “Vietnamization” by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In shifting more of 
the war’s burden to the South Vietnamese, the president was quietly redefining success. 
Realizing, in Nixon’s words, that “total military victory was no longer possible,” the new 
administration sought a “fair negotiated settlement that would preserve the 
independence of South Vietnam.”  (Both Nixon and Laird believed flagging domestic 
support was limiting their options, long a concern of senior policymakers.) Abrams would 
preside over an American war effort increasingly concerned with reducing casualties 
while arranging for U.S. troop withdrawals. Moreover, the impending American departure 
did little to settle unresolved questions over the most pressing threat to South Vietnam. 
In preparing to hand over the war, should Americans be training the ARVN to defeat 
conventional North Vietnamese forces or a battered yet resilient insurgency?
After a detailed examination of the war led by Kissinger, Nixon formulated a five-point 
strategy “to end the war and win the peace.” The new policy depended first on 
pacification, redefined as “meaningful continuing security for the Vietnamese people.” 
Nixon also sought diplomatic isolation of North Vietnam and placed increasing weight on 
negotiations in Paris. Gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces was the fourth aspect of Nixon’s 
strategy. As the president recalled, “Americans needed tangible evidence that we were 
winding down the war, and the South Vietnamese needed to be given more responsibility 
for their defense.” (Some ARVN officers balked at the insinuation that they hadn’t been 
responsible for their nation’s security.) The final element, Vietnamization, aimed at 
training and equipping South Vietnam’s armed forces so they could defend the country on 
their own. Of note, political reform in Saigon, largely a task for Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker, accompanied the military side of Vietnamization. “Our whole strategy,” Nixon 
declared, “depended on whether this program succeeded.”
48
49
50
51
52
53
American Military Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965–1973
Page 13 of 34
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, AMERICAN HISTORY (americanhistory.oxfordre.com). (c) 
Oxford University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details 
see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
For Abrams, the problem now became one of synchronizing all facets of his “one war” 
approach. Back in August 1968, MACV had to fend off another enemy offensive, the third 
of the year. Without retreating from the conventional threat, Abrams turned increasing 
attention to pacification. Under the influence of the new CORDS chief William Colby, the 
GVN initiated an Accelerated Pacification Campaign at year’s end. The campaign 
endeavored to upgrade 1,000 contested hamlets to relatively secure ratings by the end of 
January 1969. To provide political space for the Saigon government, U.S. military 
operations increased dramatically to keep the enemy off balance, further depopulating 
the countryside and creating more refugees.  In truth, the war under Abrams was no 
less violent than under Westmoreland. Still, the new MACV chief hoped to cut into the 
NLF infrastructure by boosting the number of those who would rally to Saigon’s side 
under the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, reinvigorating local defense forces, and 
neutralizing the insurgency’s political cadre.  This last goal fell largely to “Phoenix,” an 
intelligence coordination program that targeted the NLF political organization for 
destruction by police and local militia forces. MACV believed the defeat of the enemy 
infrastructure “essential to preclude re-establishment of an operational or support base 
to which the VC can return.”
While media attention often focused on battles like the costly engagement at “Hamburger 
Hill” in May 1969, conventional combat operations overshadowed MACV’s larger efforts 
to improve and modernize South Vietnam’s armed forces. For Abrams, any successful 
American withdrawal was predicated on improvements in this key area of Vietnamization. 
In the field, U.S. advisers trained their counterparts on small-unit patrolling and 
coordinating artillery support with infantry and armor operations. In garrison, the 
Americans concentrated on improving the ARVN promotion system and building an 
effective maintenance program. Moreover, ARVN leadership and morale needed attention 
to help reduce desertion rates. So too did intelligence, logistic, and operational planning 
programs. Abrams also had to propose an optimal force structure and help develop an 
operational approach best suited to ARVN capabilities.
Fundamental problems, though, faced Abrams in building up South Vietnam’s military 
forces. After Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam’s president since the September 1967 
election, announced a national mobilization in mid-1968, the size of the regular army and 
popular and regional forces increased substantially. In two years, the total armed forces 
grew by 40 percent. Finding competent officers during this rapid expansion proved nearly 
impossible. Additionally, capable ARVN leaders, of which there were many, too often 
found themselves and their units still relegated to secondary roles during allied 
maneuvers.  These officers consequently lacked experience in coordinating multifaceted 
operations required for effective counterinsurgency. Problems within the enlisted ranks 
rivaled those among ARVN’s leadership. Newsweek offered a harsh appraisal of the 
typical South Vietnamese trooper who was “often dragooned into an army where he is 
poorly trained, badly paid, insufficiently indoctrinated about why he is fighting—and, for 
the most part, led by incompetent officers.”  Simply increasing the number of soldiers 
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and supplying them with better weapons would not achieve the larger goals of 
Vietnamization.
Moreover, the ultimate success of Vietnamization depended on resolving perennial 
problems. Hanoi continued to send men and material into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail. North Vietnamese units still found refuge in sanctuaries along the Cambodian 
and Laotian borders. Thus, expanding the war into Cambodia offered an opportunity to 
give the GVN the breathing space it needed. From his first day in office, Nixon sought to 
“quarantine” Cambodia. (Hanoi had taken advantage of the nominally neutral country by 
building base areas from which NVA units could infiltrate into South Vietnam.) To Nixon 
and Kissinger, improvements in ARVN readiness and pacification mattered only if South 
Vietnam’s borders were secure. On April 30, 1970, the president announced that U.S. 
troops were fighting in Cambodia. By expanding the war, Nixon was hoping to shorten it. 
While officials in Saigon and Washington heralded the operation’s accomplishments—
Nixon stated that the “performance of the ARVN had demonstrated that Vietnamization 
was working”—the incursion into Cambodia left a mixed record. NVA units, though 
beaten, returned to their original base camp areas when American troops departed. By 
early June, the allies had searched only 5 percent of the 7,000 square miles of borderland 
despite having aimed to disrupt the enemy’s logistical bases. Additionally, the ARVN’s 
reliance on American firepower did not augur well for a future without U.S. air and 
artillery backing.
Worse, the Cambodian incursion set off a firestorm of political protest at home. After Ohio 
National Guardsmen fired into a demonstration at Kent State University on May 4, 
leaving four students dead, a wave of antiwar rallies swept the nation, closing nearly 450 
colleges and universities. Less than four months earlier, the New York Times reported on 
the My Lai massacre. In March 1968, with the Tet offensive still raging, American soldiers 
on a search and destroy mission had summarily executed more than 300 unarmed 
civilians. Claims of civilian casualties prompted an informal inquiry, but army 
investigators covered up the story for nearly eighteen months.  While most 
congressional leaders still supported Nixon, many began openly questioning the war’s 
conduct. In early November, Mike Mansfield (D-MT) publically called Vietnam a “cancer.” 
“It’s a tragedy,” argued the Montana senator. “It’s eating out the heart of America. It’s 
doing us no good.” Senator George McGovern (D-SD) joined the chorus of dissenters, 
imploring Nixon to “stop our participation in the horrible destruction of this tiny country 
and its people.” The loss of support incensed the president. Nixon insisted that the pace 
of Vietnamization, not the level of dissent, determine U.S. troop withdrawals. Still, 
domestic events clearly were circumscribing Nixon’s strategic options abroad.
The discord at home seemed matched by discontent within the ranks of U.S. troops 
remaining in South Vietnam. Though contemporary views of a disintegrating army now 
appear overblown, clearly the strategic withdrawal was taking its toll on American 
soldiers. By early 1970, with the first units already departed Vietnam and more scheduled 
to leave, officers worried how the withdrawal was affecting their soldiers’ capacity to 
fight. One journalist recounted how “talk of fragging, of hard drugs, of racial conflict, 
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seems bitter, desperate, often dangerous.”  A company commander operating along the 
Cambodian border with the 1st Cavalry Division found declining motivation among his 
troops disrupting unit effectiveness. “The colonel wants to make contact with the enemy 
and so do I,” reported the young captain, “but the men flat don’t.”  Few draftees wanted 
to be fighting in Vietnam in the first place and even fewer wanted to risk being killed in a 
war clearly that was winding down. In addition, Abrams increasingly had to concern 
himself with racial polarization inside his army. Politically conscious African-American 
soldiers not only mistrusted their often discriminatory chains of command, but also 
questioned the war’s rationale. Many blacks denounced the ideal of bringing democracy 
to South Vietnam when they were denied many freedoms at home. In short, the U.S. Army 
in Vietnam seemed to be unraveling.
By the end of 1970, U.S. strength dropped to some 254,800 soldiers remaining in country. 
Kissinger warned that unilateral withdrawals were weakening the bargaining position of 
the United States in Paris, but Nixon continued with the redeployments to prove 
Vietnamization was on track.  With the new year, however, came the realization that NVA 
logistical bases remained intact. While the Cambodian operation had denied Hanoi the 
use of the Sihanoukville port, the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued to serve as a major 
infiltration route into South Vietnam. “An invasion of the Laos Panhandle,” one ARVN 
officer recalled, thus “became an attractive idea.” Such an operation would “retain the 
initiative for the RVNAF, disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies to South 
Vietnam, and greatly reduce the enemy’s capability to launch an offensive in 1971.”  The 
ARVN’s spotty performance in the ensuing operation, Lam Son 719, further fueled 
speculations that Vietnamization might not be working as reported. Though Nixon 
declared the campaign had “assured” the next round of U.S. troop withdrawals, Kissinger 
worried that Lam Son had exposed “lingering deficiencies” that raised questions over 
South Vietnam’s ability to bear the full burden of the ongoing war.
If Kissinger agonized over the need to balance negotiations with troop withdrawals and 
offensive operations to keep the enemy off balance, he was not alone. Inside Hanoi’s 
Politburo, Le Duan equally pondered strategic alternatives in the aftermath of Lam Son 
719. Though only sixteen U.S. maneuver battalions remained in South Vietnam by early 
1972, on all fronts the war appeared deadlocked. Le Duan hoped a new invasion would 
“defeat the American ‘Vietnamization’ policy, gain a decisive victory in 1972, and force 
the U.S. imperialists to negotiate an end to the war from a position of defeat.”  Abrams 
remained unclear regarding enemy intentions. Was a large-scale invasion an act of 
desperation, as Nixon believed, or a way to gain leverage in negotiations by controlling 
South Vietnamese territory? North Vietnamese strategists certainly were taking risks but 
not out of desperation. The 1972 Nguyen-Hue campaign aimed for a collapse of South 
Vietnam’s armed forces, Thieu’s ouster, and the formation of a coalition government. 
Failing these ambitious goals, Le Duan envisioned the struggle continuing against a 
weakened ARVN. In either case, the Politburo believed its “actions would totally change 
the character of the war in South Vietnam.”
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The subsequent “Easter Offensive,” begun on March 30, 1972, unleashed three separate 
NVA thrusts into South Vietnam. In some areas, the ARVN fought bravely; in others, 
soldiers broke and ran. Abrams responded by throwing B-52 bombers into the battle as 
Nixon ordered resumption of bombing in the North and the mining of Haiphong harbor. 
Gradually, yet perceptibly, the offensive’s momentum began to slow. Although North 
Vietnam’s spring offensive had ended with no dramatic battlefield victory, it had met its 
goal of changing the character of the war.  U.S. officials proclaimed Vietnamization a 
final success given that the ARVN had successfully blunted the enemy’s assault. 
Overwhelming U.S. air support, however, quite literally saved many units from being 
overrun and, more intangibly, helped sustain morale during hard months of fighting. 
Equally important, North Vietnamese leaders made several errors during the campaign. 
The separate offensives into South Vietnam dissipated combat strength while placing 
overwhelming strain on logistical support capabilities. Moreover, tactical commanders 
lacked experience in employing tanks and squandered infantry units in suicidal 
assaults.
By the end of June, only 49,000 U.S. troops remained in South Vietnam. Like his 
predecessor, Abrams was pulled to become the army’s chief of staff before the guns had 
fallen silent. Throughout the summer and fall, stalemated discussions in Paris mirrored 
the military standoff inside South Vietnam. In October, Kissinger reported to Nixon a 
breakthrough with the North Vietnamese delegation and announced an impending cease-
fire. President Thieu fumed that Kissinger had conceded too much, allowing NVA units to 
remain in South Vietnam and refused to sign any agreement. The resulting diplomatic 
impasse, fueled by Thieu’s defiance and Hanoi’s intransigence, infuriated Nixon. By 
December, the president had reached his limits and ordered a massive air campaign 
against North Vietnam to break the deadlock. Nixon intended the bombing assault, 
codenamed Linebacker II, to induce both Hanoi and Saigon to return to the negotiating 
table. On December 26, the Politburo agreed to resume talks while Nixon pressed Thieu 
to support the armistice. The final settlement changed little from the principles outlined 
in October. One month later, on January 27, 1973, the United States, North Vietnam, 
South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government signed the Paris 
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.
Conclusions
In large sense, Nixon’s use of B-52 bombers during Linebacker II illustrated the limits of 
American military power in Vietnam. The press reacted strongly, referring to the bombing 
of urban targets in North Vietnam as “war by tantrum” and an act of “senseless terror.”
But by late 1972, B-52s were the only tools left in Nixon’s arsenal. Despite years of effort 
and sacrifice, the best the Americans could achieve was a stalemate only temporarily 
broken by strategic bombing. Many senior military officers, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
would point to Linebacker II as proof of a mismanaged war. They argued that if only 
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civilian policymakers had been less restrictive in setting unnecessary boundaries, those in 
uniform could have won much earlier and at much less cost. Such arguments, however, 
tended to discount the larger political concerns of presidents and their advisers hoping to 
limit a war that had become the centerpiece of American foreign policy and one that had 
divided the nation.
Others advanced a different “if only” argument regarding U.S. military strategy for 
Vietnam. They posited that upon taking command of MACV, Abrams, deviating almost 
immediately from Westmoreland’s conventional methods, had changed the American 
approach to, and thus nature of, the war. This “better war” thesis found acceptance 
among many officers in whom a conviction endured that a better application of strategy 
could have yielded better political results. Yet senior American commanders, even before 
Westmoreland’s tenure at MACV, tended to see the war as a comprehensive whole and 
devised their strategy accordingly. Despite frequent heavy-handedness in applying 
military power inside South Vietnam, almost all officers recognized that the war 
ultimately was a contest for political power.
Comprehending the complexities of strategy and effectively implementing it, however, 
were not one and the same. Officers serving in Vietnam quickly found that strategy 
included much more than simply drafting a plan of political-military action. The 
complexity of the threat, both political and military, confounded U.S. analysts and staff 
officers. Westmoreland understood the important role played by southern insurgent 
forces but argued he could not stamp out these irregular “termites” without substantially 
eliminating the enemy’s main force units. Even ascertaining enemy motives proved 
difficult. Not long after Abrams took command, MACV still faced a “real problem, 
following the Tet offensive, trying to figure out” the enemy’s overall military strategy.
Perhaps most importantly, senior U.S. policymakers were asking too much of their 
military strategists. In the end, the war was a struggle between and among Vietnamese. 
For the United States, the foundation on which American forces waged a struggle—one 
that involved both construction of an effective host government and destruction of a 
committed communist-nationalist enemy—proved too fragile. Officers like Westmoreland 
and Abrams found that nation-building in a time of war was one of the most difficult tasks 
to ask of a military force. Yet American faith in the power to reconstruct, if not create, a 
South Vietnamese political community led to policies that did not address a fundamental 
issue—the internal contest to define and come to a consensus on Vietnamese nationalism 
and identity in the modern age.
More than any other conflict during the Cold War era, Vietnam exposed the limits of 
American military power overseas. It was a reality that many U.S. citizens found, and 
continue to find, discomforting. Yet if a perspective is to be gained from the long 
American experience in Southeast Asia, it lies here. Not all problems can be solved by 
military force, even when that force is combined with political, economic, and social 
efforts. The capacity of Americans to reshape new political and social communities may 
not, in fact, be limitless. Writing of his own experiences in the Korean War, Matthew 
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Ridgway offered an important conclusion while the war in Vietnam was still raging. In 
setting foreign policy objectives, the general advised that policymakers look “to define 
them with care and to make sure they lie within the range of our vital national interests 
and that their accomplishment is within our capabilities.”  For those seeking to 
understand the disappointments of American military strategy during the Vietnam War, 
Ridgway’s counsel seems a useful starting point.
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VanDeMark’s Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
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Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
provides a balanced overview of the president’s struggles with the war.
The topic of U.S. military strategy is hotly debated. Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s 
War: Reassessing American Strategy in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), offers a reinterpretation of those works in suggesting Americans were blind 
to the realities of the war. Samples of these latter works include: Andrew F. Krepinevich 
Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Harry G. 
Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Appraisal of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 
1982); and Jeffrey Record, The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1998). More persuasive is Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washington, DC: 
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Clodfelter takes on the air war in The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of 
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Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010). Finally, an often overlooked yet important work on senior military 
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memoirs from junior officers and soldiers are: Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977); David Donovan, Once a Warrior King (New York: 
Ballantine, 1986); Stuart A. Herrington, Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: 
A Personal Account (Navato, CA: Presidio, 2004); and Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. 
Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: HarperCollins, 1993). Less a 
memoir than an excellent collective biography of the enlisted soldier serving in Vietnam is
Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993)
Journalists’ accounts were important in covering the American experience and in setting 
a foundation for how the war has been outlined in popular memory. Among the most 
indispensable of this genre are David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: 
Random House, 1969); David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: America and 
Vietnam during the Kennedy Era (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964, 1988); Michael Herr,
Dispatches (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New York: 
Doubleday, 1971); and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in 
Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988). Also useful is Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How 
the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in 
Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977).
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The South Vietnamese perspective often gets lost in American-centric works on the war 
but should not be disregarded. Mark P. Bradley’s Vietnam at War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) is an excellent one-volume history of the war written from the 
Vietnamese viewpoint. Both Andrew Wiest, Vietnam’s Forgotten Army Vietnam’s 
Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN (New York: New York University 
Press, 2008) and Robert K. Brigham, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), make an important contribution for 
understanding the U.S. Army’s most important allies. Three provincial studies also delve 
into the war inside South Vietnam’s villages: Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: 
The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991); Jeffrey Race, War 
Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1972); and James Walker Trullinger Jr., Village at War: An Account of 
Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Longman, 1980). For an argument on the cultural 
divide between allies, see Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the 
Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).
If the South Vietnamese perspective often is overlooked, the North Vietnamese also tends 
to get short shrift in American works. Relying on new research, the best among this 
group are Pierre Asselin, Hanoi’s’ Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2013); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International 
History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2012); Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese 
Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) and Ending the Vietnam War: 
The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Victory in 
Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by 
Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); William J. Duiker, The 
Communist Road to Power, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); and Warren Wilkins,
Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong’s Big Unit War against the U.S., 1965–
1966 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).
Finally, students should not overlook the value of novels in understanding the war from 
the soldiers’ viewpoint. Among the best are Bao Ninh, The Sorrow of War: A Novel of 
North Vietnam (New York: Riverhead, 1996); Josiah Bunting, The Lionheads (New York: 
George Braziller, 1972); Karl Marlantes, Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War (New 
York: Atlantic Monthly, 2010); Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1990); and Robert Roth, Sand in the Wind (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
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Primary Sources
Among the best documentary collections are Michael H. Hunt, A Vietnam War Reader: A 
Documentary History from American and Vietnamese Perspectives (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), and Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: 
An International History in Documents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Also 
useful is Robert McMahon and Thomas Paterson, Major Problems in the History of the 
Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (Boston: Wadsworth, 2007). For encyclopedias on 
the war, see Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, 
Social & Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), and Stanley I. Kutler,
Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, 2d ed. (New York: Scribner, 2005).
Researchers should also consult two still useful collections of documents: The Pentagon 
Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam, 
ed. Mike Gravel, 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon, 1971–1972), and William Conrad Gibbons, The 
U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and 
Relationships, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986–1995). The 
U.S. Department of State has collected a wonderful array of documents in the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. These resources can be found online at
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.
For researchers delving into primary sources, the best place to begin is the Virtual 
Vietnam Archive run by Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas. This online archive 
houses more than four million pages of materials and is located at http://
www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/. The physical archive has much more additional 
material for researchers. For higher level strategic insights, the presidential libraries in 
Boston, Massachusetts (Kennedy), Austin, Texas (Johnson), and Yorba Linda, California 
(Nixon) have important archival holdings. Those seeking insights into the U.S. Army will 
find excellent resources at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair, Washington, 
DC. The National Archives in College Park, Maryland, offers a vast amount of resources 
as well. Finally, for those wishing to focus on cultural issues within the region, 
researchers may wish to consult the John M. Echols Collection on Southeast Asia at 
Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. Researcher information can be found at http://
asia.library.cornell.edu/ac/Echols/index.
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2008.
Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.
Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in 
Vietnam. Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.
Notes:
(1.) JCS quoted in Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 
229. Hastings argued that the “Korean War occupies a unique place in history, as the first 
superpower essay of the nuclear age in the employment of limited force to achieve limited 
objectives,” p. 338. On the relationship of Korea to Europe, see Stanley Sandler, The 
Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 
144.
(2.) Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967; reprint, 
New York: Da Capo Press, 1986), 145, 232.
(3.) Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), 311. For a broader context of this period, see Jonathan M. House, A Military 
History of the Cold War, 1944–1962 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012).
(4.) Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Security (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), 5, 7.
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(5.) Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 
1942–1976 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 278. See also Douglas 
Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2103), 217. For a counterargument on how U.S. Army 
officers shunned learning and thus lost the war in Vietnam, see John Nagl, Learning to 
Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002).
(6.) Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1957), 139. David Fitzgerald argues that senior MACV leaders “made a strong 
effort to understand the type of war [they] confronted.” Learning to Forget: US Army 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
Security Studies, 2013), 38. On multiple dimensions of strategy, see Colin S. Gray, “Why 
strategy is difficult,” in Strategic Studies: A Reader, 2d ed., ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and 
Joseph A. Maiolo (New York: Routledge, 2014), 43.
(7.) Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–
1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 241. On larger Cold War issues, see
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 240.
(8.) McNamara quoted in Gerard J. DeGroot, A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam 
War (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2000), 135. On enemy escalation and its impact, see David 
Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 346. B. H. Liddell 
Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 335–336.
(9.) Neil L. Jamieson argues that “Vietnamese clung to and fought over their own 
competing and incompatible visions of what Vietnam was and what it might and should 
become.” In Neil L. Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), x.
(10.) Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960 (Washington, 
DC: Center of Military History, 1983), 336. While early MAAG commanders realized the 
importance of economic development as part of an overall approach to strategy, 
Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr, who took over MAAG in August 1960, elevated the 
importance of counterinsurgency training within the ARVN ranks. Spector, Advice and 
Support, 365. See also Alexander S. Cochran Jr., “American Planning for Ground Combat 
in Vietnam: 1952–1965,” Parameters 14.2 (Summer 1984): 65.
(11.) Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 65, 72–73. While sympathetic to Ngo Dinh 
Diem, Mark Moyar covers the American participation during the advisory years in
Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).
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(12.) Agrovilles were supposedly secure communities to which rural civilians were 
relocated in hopes of separating them from NLF insurgents. On Diem, development, and 
engineering a social revolution, see Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the 
United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2013). For a competing interpretation, see James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The 
United States and State Building, 1954–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). On training of South Vietnam forces, James Lawton Collins Jr., The Development 
and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975).
(13.) Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–
1967 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 35.
(14.) For the North Vietnamese perspective, especially in the years preceding full 
American intervention, see Pierre Asselin, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), and William J. Duiker, The Communist 
Road to Power, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview , 1996). For a perspective of Diem 
somewhat at odds with Miller, and especially Moyar, see Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: 
Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963 (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
(15.) Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 
1945–1968 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996), 94. On the air campaign, see Mark Clodfelter,
The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 
1989), and Lloyd C. Gardner, “Lyndon Johnson and the Bombing of Vietnam: Politics and 
Military Choices,” in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, ed. David L. Anderson 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
(16.) Westmoreland quoted in Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of 
the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 71. For an example of senior officers 
blaming civilians for limiting military means to achieve political ends, see U.S. Grant 
Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978).
(17.) On the contentious topic of escalation, see Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost 
Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999), and Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for 
Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995). David L. Di Leo offers a treatment of a key 
dissenter inside the Johnson White House in George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of 
Containment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
(18.) Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New 
York: Times Books, 1995), 188.
(19.) Westmoreland’s assessment in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department 
History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam, vol. 4, ed. Mike Gravel. (Boston: 
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Beacon Press, 1971–1972), 606. See also chapter 7, “Evolution of Strategy,” in William C. 
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976).
(20.) Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History: 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 
1988), 354. On MACV guidance in implementing this broad strategy, see John M. Carland, 
“Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents,” Journal of 
Military History 68.2 (April 2004): 553–574.
(21.) U. S. Grant Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 100. The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 
4, 296.
(22.) Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Công Insurrection Manual 
for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 46, 61. On the 
evolution of Hanoi’s strategic thinking, see David W. P. Elliott, “Hanoi’s Strategy in the 
Second Indochina War,” in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, ed. 
Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).
(23.) The strategic debate is best outlined in Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An 
International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2012), 71. See also Nguyen Vu Tung, “Coping with the United States: 
Hanoi’s Search for an Effective Strategy,” in The Vietnam War, ed. Peter Lowe (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 46–48; and Hanoi Assessment of Guerrilla War in South, 
November 1966, Folder 17, Box 06, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 01-Assessment and 
Strategy, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas (hereafter cited as 
TTUVA). Resolution 12 in Communist Strategy as Reflected in Lao Dong Party and 
COSVN Resolutions, Folder 26, Box 07, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 06-Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, TTUVA, p. 3.
(24.) For a useful historiographical sketch on the debates over intervention and American 
strategy, see Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2009), chapters 3 and 4.
(25.) Westmoreland quoted in Davidson, Vietnam at War, 313. On early U.S. Army actions 
in Vietnam, see John M. Carland, Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), and Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and 
Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973 (Novato, CA: 
Presidio, 1985).
(26.) Westmoreland explained his rationale for focusing on main force units in A Soldier 
Reports, 180. For a counterargument against this approach, see Andrew F. Krepinevich 
Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
(27.) The best monograph on the Ia Drang battles remains Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. 
Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: HarperCollins, 1993). For a 
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perspective from the enemy side, see Warren Wilkins, Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: 
The Viet Cong’s Big Unit War against the U.S., 1965–1966 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2011), especially chapter 6.
(28.) COMUSMACV memorandum, “Increased Emphasis on Rural Construction,” 8 
December 1965, Correspondence, 1965–1966, Box 35, Jonathan O. Seaman Papers, U.S. 
Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as MHI).
(29.) Westmoreland highlighted Hanoi’s continuing infiltration of forces into South 
Vietnam at the end of 1965. An evaluation of U.S. operations in early December 
underscored his concerns that “our attrition of their forces in South Vietnam is 
insufficient to offset this buildup.” In Carland, “Winning the Vietnam War,” 570. On the 
media’s take on these early battles, see “G.I.’s Found Rising to Vietnam Test,” New York 
Times, December 26, 1965.
(30.) Memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Robert S. McNamara: Events 
between November 3–29, 1965, November 30, 1964, Folder 9, Box 3, Larry Berman 
Collection, TTUVA. On McNamara being “shaken” by the meeting, see Neil Sheehan, A 
Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 
1988), 579–580. McNamara, In Retrospect, 221–222.
(31.) “Presidential Decisions: The Honolulu Conference, February 6–8, 1966,” Folder 2, 
Box 4, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Research), TTUVA. John T. 
Wheeler, “Only a Fourth of South Viet Nam Is Under Control of Saigon Regime,”
Washington Star, January 25, 1966.
(32.) “1966 Program to Increase the Effectiveness of Military Operations and Anticipated 
Results Thereof,” February 8, 1966, in The War in Vietnam: The Papers of William C. 
Westmoreland, ed. Robert E. Lester (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 
1993), Incl. 6, Folder 4, Reel 6. See also U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, vol. 5, Vietnam, 1967 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2002), 216–219 (hereafter cited as FRUS). Westmoreland took to heart the 
importance of rural construction. See MACV Commander’s Conference, February 20, 
1966, Counter VCI Folder, Historian’s Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort 
McNair, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as CMH).
(33.) Pacification defined in “Handbook for Military Support of Pacification,” February 
1968, Folder 14, Box 5, United States Armed Forces Manual Collection, TTUVA. Seymour 
Topping, “Crisis in Saigon Snags U.S. Effort,” New York Times, April 5, 1966. Martin G. 
Clemis, “Competing and Incompatible Visions: Revolution, Pacification, and the Political 
Organization of Space during the Second Indochina War,” paper presented at the 81st 
Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, April 2014, Kansas City, MO.
(34.) On Westmoreland’s approach to pacification, see Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s 
War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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2014), chapter 5. For a counterargument that dismisses allied pacification efforts, see
Nick Turse, Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2013).
(35.) Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and 
Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 55. For a contemporary argument of 
Malaya not being relevant to Vietnam, see Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness: 1953–66
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 272.
(36.) Thomas L. Ahern Jr., Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 171–175.
(37.) The best monograph on pacification remains Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The 
American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995). For a 
balanced treatment of Komer, see Frank L. Jones, Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and 
American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). See also
Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1986). A partial impetus for an increased emphasis on pacification 
stemmed from a March 1966 report known as PROVN, shorthand for “A Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam.” PROVN stressed nonmilitary 
means and argued that “victory” could be achieved only by “bringing the individual 
Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of South 
Vietnam (GVN).” Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, “A Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (Department of the Army, 
March 1966), 1, 3. The best review of this still hotly debated document is Andrew J. Birtle, 
“PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Military History
72.4 (October 2008): 1213–1247.
(38.) Robert W. Komer, “Clear, Hold and Rebuild,” Army 20.5 5 (May 1970): 19. On 
CORDS establishment, see National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, FRUS, 1964–
1968, vol. 5, 398–399. Though revolutionary development remained, at least nominally, a 
South Vietnamese program, many observers believed the inability of the ARVN to take 
over pacification in the countryside helped spur the establishment of CORDS. Robert 
Shaplen, The Road from War: Vietnam, 1965–1970 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 122. 
As of March 31, 1967, 53 ARVN infantry battalions were performing missions in direct 
support of pacification. MACV Monthly Evaluation Report, March 1967, MHI, 13.
(39.) For a contemporary discussion on the cultural divide between Americans and 
Vietnamese and how this impacted both military operations and the pacification program, 
see Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). Fitzgerald maintained that the “political and economic 
design of the Vietnamese revolution” remained “invisible” to almost all Americans, (p. 
143).
American Military Strategy in the Vietnam War, 1965–1973
Page 29 of 34
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, AMERICAN HISTORY (americanhistory.oxfordre.com). (c) 
Oxford University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details 
see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
(40.) For competing tasks within CORDS, see Chester L. Cooper, et al., “The American 
Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Volume III: History of Pacification,” March 1972, 
Folder 65, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Vietnam War Documents Collection, 
TTUVA, 271. Journalist Ward Just reported that the real yardsticks of pacification’s 
progress were “the Vietnamese view of events, the Vietnamese mood, the Vietnamese will 
and the Vietnamese capability.” See “Another Measure of Vietnam’s War,” Washington 
Post, October 15, 1967. On personnel turbulence, see Mark DePu, “Vietnam War: The 
Individual Rotation Policy,” http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-
rotation-policy.htm.
(41.) As a sampling of contemporary journalist critiques of the war in 1967, see: Joseph 
Kraft, “The True Failure in Saigon—South Vietnam’s Fighting Force,” Los Angeles Times, 
May 3, 1967; Ward Just, “This War May Be Unwinnable,” Washington Post, June 4, 1967; 
and R. W. Apple, “Vietnam: The Signs of Stalemate,” New York Times, August 7, 1967. On 
the war in 1967 being perceived as a stalemate, see Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from 
Vietnam (New York: David McKay, 1969), 67; and Anthony James Joes, The War for South 
Viet Nam, 1954–1975, rev. ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 96. On military operations 
early in 1967, see Bernard W. Rogers, Cedar Falls–Junction City: A Turning Point
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, 2004).
(42.) On Johnson’s salesmanship campaign, see Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: The 
Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), especially chapters 5–7. 
On the MACV-CIA debate, see James J. Wirtz, “Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle 
Controversy during the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly 106.2 (Summer 1991): 
239–263.
(43.) On Hanoi’s views and its policy for a decisive victory, see Victory in Vietnam: The 
Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 206–207. On overriding political goals of 
Tet, see: Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese 
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